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ABSTRACT
Islamic feminism in Turkey is neither monolithic nor static.  The article argued that from the 1980s onward there are three phases 
of Islamic feminism in which the Islamic feminism evolved and changed in its discourse, methods and concerns. The first phase 
is the late 1980s and 1990s where pious women integrated into the political system. This first phase can be considered as the 
emergence of Islam (ist) feminists. The second phase, starting from the AKP rule, 2002 to 2013, shows transformation from Islam 
(ist) feminism to Islam(ic) feminism. In that respect Islamist feminism refers to pious women, who take active role in participating 
the social and political arena in order for the success of Islamic cause. To put in other words, they question the secular state structure 
and try to open up a space for Islam in the government. The third phase is currently in the formation stage in the post-2013 Gezi 
Park protests. This era is the emergence of true Islamic feminists, in which it is marked by the extensive use of social media and the 
process and challenges become more secular.
Keywords: Islamic feminism, AKP, Islamist feminism, secular state, social media feminism, Turkey, political Islam
RESUMEN
El feminismo islámico en Turquía no es monolítico ni estático. El artículo argumentaba que desde la década de 1980 en adelante hay 
tres fases del feminismo islámico en las que el feminismo islámico evolucionó y cambió en su discurso, métodos y preocupaciones. 
La primera fase es a fines de los años ochenta y noventa, donde las mujeres piadosas se integraron al sistema político. Esta primera 
fase puede considerarse como el surgimiento de las feministas islámicas (ist). La segunda fase, a partir de la regla AKP, 2002 a 
2013, muestra la transformación del feminismo del Islam (ist) al feminismo del Islam (ic). En ese sentido, el feminismo islamista 
se refiere a las mujeres piadosas, que participan activamente en la arena social y política para el éxito de la causa islámica. En otras 
palabras, cuestionan la estructura estatal secular e intentan abrir un espacio para el Islam en el gobierno. La tercera fase se encuentra 
actualmente en la etapa de formación en las protestas posteriores al Parque Gezi 2013. Esta era es la aparición de verdaderas 
feministas islámicas, en la que está marcada por el uso extensivo de las redes sociales y el proceso y los desafíos se vuelven más 
seculares.
Palabras clave: feminismo islámico, AKP, feminismo islamista, estado secular, feminismo en las redes sociales, Turquía, islam 
político
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INTRODUCTION
Up until the 1980s the dominant feminist discourse both in academia and the social life in Turkey was secular and influenced 
by Western feminism’s ideology and discourses. In that respect, Nükhet Şirman identifies 3 stages in Turkish feminist 
movement (Şirman, 1989). The first stage is the final era of the Ottoman Empire between mid 19th century to early 20th 
century which criticize the Ottoman family system. The second stage was during the 1930s which the state gave certain 
rights and liberties to women in its way to modernizing the new Republic. This stage is often labeled as the state sponsored 
feminism and one of the major points of reference in the evolution of later feminist movements. The third stage, which is 
the main focus of this article, criticize the state feminism in excluding certain groups from the state structure. 
Turkish Republic’s modernization process involved specifically the women’s participation in social life. The republican 
reforms gave women right to vote and elect, annulled polygamy, introduced co-education. However, at the same time 
the reformers saw headscarf as an identity marker of the past and although did not pass a law against wearing it, they 
strongly discouraged women from wearing it (Kandiyoti, 1987), and not-wearing these garments became an unwritten 
precondition for upward social mobility. Leaving the traditional Islamic dress behind did not present such a huge problem 
for many women, but for others it did, particularly for those who joined the Islamist movements after the 1970s (Özcan, 
2018). From the 1980s onwards pious women started challenging the dominant secular (read Western) state structure and 
it’s designation of ideal feminism where the pious (headscarved) women were seen inferior, un-modern, backward and/
or essentially different than the secular women.  Having said that, the Islamic feminism since then is not monolithic or 
unchanging. The article argues that in addition to 1980 military coup there are 3 ruptures which shaped the evolution of 
Islamic feminist movement in Turkey, first one being the rise of Islamist Refah Partisi in 1996 as a coalition government, 
second one being the rise of AKP as a conservative political party and finally 2013 Gezi Park protests. In line with these 
developments the article also argues that there is a change in academic and journalistic writings of these feminist women 
regarding the pious women’s struggles.   
The article bridges the academic evolution of Islamic feminism with the social evolution of the movement in Turkey and 
argues that in the post 1980s one can see 3 phases of evolution of the Islamic feminism. The first phase is the late 1980s 
and 1990s where pious women integrated into the political system. Although at this rate coining the term Islamic feminism 
is not very appropriate because it is more about pious women’s activity for/within the Islamist movements. This phase is 
important because it gave rise to the Islamic feminist thought and social movements. This first phase can be considered as 
the emergence of Islam(ist) feminists. The second phase, starting from the AKP rule, 2002 to 2013, is when pious women 
started questioning the individual rights and liberties and also criticizing of the Islamic movement’s male counterparts. 
This phase shows transformation from Islam(ist) feminism to Islam(ic) feminism. In that respect the term Islamist is used 
to describe, particularly in the 1980s, “the act of using Islam as a source of political activism rather than practicing it as 
a nonpolitical daily ritual” (Marshall, 2005). Therefore, Islamist feminism refers to pious women, who take active role in 
participating the social and political arena in order for the success of Islamic cause. To put in other words, they question the 
secular state structure and try to open up a space for Islam in the government. 
Islamic feminism on the other hand refers to “a new discourse or interpretation of Islam and gender grounded in ijtihad, 
or independent intellectual investigation of the Qur’an and other religious texts” (Badran, 2005, 3). Islamic feminism 
does not aim to achieve a religious political structure, rather it aims to enhance pious women’s conditions with an Islamic 
discourse. Islamic feminists question the patriarchal interpretations and practices of Quran which subordinates women into 
a secondary position. To put in other words, it is a feminist discourse and practice articulated within an Islamic paradigm. 
It derives its understanding and mandate from Quran, demand equality and justice for women and men in the totality of 
existence (Badran, 2005). Concordantly, the article points out that unlike Islamist feminists, Islamic feminists have mutual 
ground with secular feminists as both are located within and context of the secular nation state parameters.
The study found out that in the first two phases the term feminism is most of the time denied by pious activist women. 
Despite this, due to their contribution to headscarf problem, living pious in a secular state, improving women’s rights in 
Islamic and patriarchal societies necessitates to include them in the feminist literature and the evolution of the movement in 
Turkey.  The third phase is currently in the formation stage in the post-2013 Gezi Park protests. This era is the emergence of 
true Islamic feminists, in which they own being feminists and the feminism process is becoming more secular. In this phase, 
the use of social media platforms gained impetus. Furthermore it is also found that although in Turkey Islamic feminism 
emerged around same time as the rest of the World, there are serious differences between the emergence of Islamic feminism 
in Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world.
The article is qualitative case study consisting of the writings and speeches of pious women who are active in the politics with 
respect to pious women’s struggles. The time period spans from 1980s to 2019, beginning from the third military coup of 
Turkey, which in the aftermath saw pious women starting actively challenging the secular ideology and the governments, 
till today which the pious women start challenging the conservative-religious government and their patriarchal discourse. 
The article particularly focuses on the AKP period starting from 2002 onwards because this is when the transformation 
to Islamic feminism takes place. Since 2002 during the conservative AKP rule, the government co-opted pious women 
who were politically active and who challenged the former governments for their approach to pious women. For example, 
Sibel Eraslan, one of the most prominent figures in pious women’s movement who challenged the pre-AKP governments 
including the Islamist Refah Partisi and their ideologies, started writing columns in pro-government newspapers in 2003 
and became in 2018 the ministerial counsellor. When analyzed all the columns of Sibel Eraslan, written between 2003 and 
2012 it is found out that Sibel Eraslan did not question any of the decisions of the Party that put women in secondary 
positions or subordinates them. Contrarily, Hidayet Tuksal, another prominent figure in the cause who criticized the 
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government policies, was fired from Star newspaper in 2014 and later joined Taraf newspaper (Arat, 2016) and other 
non-governmental online platforms. This, along with other events, led to the current and final evolution of Islamic 
feminism where particularly in the post 2013 era, put pious women and their struggles within secular or conservative 
patriarchal state structures at the forefront rather than the Islamist cause.  
FIRST PHASE: LATE 1980S AND 1990S
The secular feminist discourse in Turkey up until the late 1980s was marked by criticisms of religion (Sayari, 1981) 
and capitalism (Kandiyoti, 1981) which they argued worked for the patriarchy.  In line with the rest of the world that 
started challenging feminism’s exclusively White/Western and middle-class stereotyping (Spivak, 1988; Mernissi, 
1987; Ahmed, 1992), Postcolonial feminists  in Turkey also criticized Turkish modernity and the state sponsored 
feminism (read Western, secular) particularly in its incapacity of referring the pious women’s struggle and their double 
victimization by patriarchy and secular state system (Ahmed, 1982; Kandiyoti, 1987; Arat, 1990). About same time 
the terminology related to Islamic feminism emerged at first in weekly publication Nokta as “Türbanlı Feministler” 
(Turban Feminists) article published on December 20, 1987.  In this publication Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, Sibel 
Eraslan, Nazife Şisman and Cihan Aktaş, were labeled as headscarved feminists. The article featured these women’s 
arguments. Aktaş argued that “the system worn men out and in response they take revenge on women”, Mualla 
Gülnaz argued that “number of children born needs to be limited, men who brag about their seeds must share 
women’s burden”,  Fatmagül Meriç argued that “Information of the Quran belonged to men, now women have that 
information too (Nokta, 1987)”. The choice of words in the article, such as the use of “turban” which has a political 
ideological connotation instead of “başörtüsü” (headscarf) which is an Anatolian cultural head-covering style, and 
the labeling of feminism at the time considered offensive and derogatory. Similar to turban the word “feminism” was 
not used in positive content, at the time it connoted with “lesbianism” and “sexual promiscuity” which particularly 
pious women did not want to be associated as.  Indeed in early 2000s Cihan Aktaş criticized the article for ascribing 
them as feminists and the choice of the word turban.  Aktaş argued that this is what white western women elitism 
of feminism is, although at 2000s she accepted that feminists along with headscarved women helped and allowed 
pious women to exist with their own identity at the public sphere (Aktaş, 2006). Afterwards it was in Nilufer Göle’s 
Modern Mahrem (Forbidden Modern) book published in 1991. She explains the tensions and conflicts between 
men and women within the Islamist cause. In it she explains the Islamist women’s support to feminists who are 
wrongly accused by Islamist male journalists and authors such as Ali Bulaç, that if feminism becomes a way of life 
then it would cause hatred between two sexes and eventually lead to homosexuality and lesbianism (Göle, 1996). 
What is important in these writings is that, Islamist women who defend feminists in their struggle with patriarchy, 
use the pronoun “they” in describing feminists. Despite both groups challenging the male oppression and use of 
headscarf as a political insigne, during the 1980s pious women did not see themselves as feminists. Indeed, in the 
90s Nazife Şişman, Cihan Aktaş, Yıldız Ramazanoğlu and Sibel Eraslan denied being identified as feminists, Tuksal 
although did not particularly denied the term, did not used it openly either (Rezaei & Nemati, 2017; Reyes et al., 
2016; Vaezi, 2018).
There are several things that differentiate this first phase of Turkish Islamic feminism from the other parts of the 
Muslim region.  In the Muslim world the leading scholars in the early era were Fatima Mernissi, Leila Ahmed in the 
70s and 80s and then followed by Margot Badran and Amina Wadud in the 2000s.Mernissi, a Moroccon sociologist 
educated in the Europe discussed sexuality in Islam and advocated a progressive, secular reading of Islam (Mernissi, 
1987).  Leila Ahmed, an Egyptian- American Islam scholar, in a similar note argues that women’s taking up veil for 
true Islam may unintendingly strengthen the political Islam which may have devastating effects on women (Ahmed, 
1992).  She separates the political Islam, the establishment, institutional one and the ethical Islam. Similarly, in 
Iran, Shahla Sherkat, the founder of Zanan in 1992, a monthly women’s magazine with allegiance to feminism and 
banned in 2008. The term feminism for the first time used in this magazine and it challenged gender inequalities 
and political Islam, supported a progressive reading of traditions and Islamic law. She was not educated in the West 
however, she was born and raised in secular Pahlavi dynasty where women had more freedoms and rights then in the 
Islamic Republic. Furthermore, the first Arab, male feminist Egyptian, Qasim Emin, also advocated for a progressive 
reading of Islam, and advocated for removal of veil, education of women in his book Tahrir al- Mar’ah ( Liberation 
of Women) published in 1899 (Amin, 1899). In Saudi Arabia, anthropologist Mai Yamani who was educated in 
Oxford, focused on honor killings and construction of gender in Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia. These examples 
show that the Islamic feminism borrows from the secular and also Western tools and discourses such as human 
rights, equality and justice with an Islamic reading. Secondly, they advocated for a progressive, more equality-based, 
female reading of Islam. Thirdly, they criticized the West’s orientalist perception of the veil and perception of Islam 
as an inherently oppressive religion to women.  
In Turkey, the emergence of Islamic feminism similar to its counterparts emerged in an interaction with a secular 
environment. Contrary to its counterparts though, it was a reaction to secularism and Western style modernization 
of Turkey. Secondly, in other parts of the Muslim world the Islamic feminism rose as an internal criticism towards 
the patriarchal and essentialist reading of Quran.  These feminists advocated for more equal footing, female reading 
of Quran and Islamic religion. They challenged political Islam, used as misogynistic polity suppressing women. 
Contrarily, in Turkey the main aim of emergency of Islamic feminism was not questioning the patriarchal or 
oppressive structure of Islam or political Islam, the primary aim was to integrate Islam into social and political 
sphere. Another difference is that, in Turkey the rise of political Islam allowed pious women to integrate into public 
space and join a political cause. This, in retrospect caused the emergence of Islamist feminism because the early pious 
women’s movements prioritized the Islamic cause rather than the women’s cause. In that sense, Islamic feminism’s 
entrance into literature and academic debates coincided with the entrance of the Islamist women into Turkish social 
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and political sphere as significant actors. 
In the social and political realm, after the September 12, 1980 military coup, 1980s and particularly the ‘90s was marked 
by rise of several Islamist movements and political Islam. Political Islam at the time was critical of Westernization and 
West’s cultural, political and economic dominance over Muslim countries including Turkey.  The Islamist women also 
were against imperialist forces on grounds that they intervened the god and his servants, the prophets and the people, 
husband and wife (Bozarslan, 2011) which according to them the main reason of suppression and marginalization of 
pious women from social sphere. University students through the religious congregations that they joined, tried entering 
into faculties with their headscarves on which eventually led to Higher Education Council’s December 20, 1982 notice 
that ban entering the universities with headscarves. The state’s control of religious symbols in public sphere did not have 
impact on men as it did on women. The headscarf ban at the universities became the arena of major argument. As the 
Islamists sought way to integrate into the system which prevented religious freedoms due to secularism, headscarf ban 
became their major case and pious women joined them in what they constitute as their right to practice their religion. 
The religious congregations started opening up associations and foundations particularly for women (Çakır, 2000). 
The main political actor at the time was Necmettin Erbakan and his National Outlook ideology based political parties. 
The most important among those parties were the Refah Partisi (RP) which in 1996 created the coalition government 
and Necmettin Erbakan became the Prime Minister. Indicating that secularism is a Western concept, he preferred 
and attempted to develop economic cooperation with the Islamic world. Throughout his premiership, by highlighting 
the brotherhood among Muslims and Muslim identity in all of his speeches, Erbakan shifted the threat perception 
towards the West (Aydındağ & Işıksal, 2018). Ideologically National Outlook movement and its political parties have 
anti-western rhetoric with ideals such as secularism or feminism are considered as occidental ideologies that are not 
compatible with Islam (Keskin-Kozat, 2003). The Women Commissions of the Party, which was founded in late 1980s 
by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was then the Head of the Istanbul Party Center, played a very important role in the 
Party’s electoral victory. Pious women through their daily door to door visits to the houses of the electorate explained to 
other women, the party program and the benefits the Party would offer to women, children and families in need. Their 
informal and fuss-free distribution of party propaganda in a friendly manner created sympathy and reflected positively 
in the ballot box. The number of women actively seeking votes for the party just in Istanbul was about eighteen thousand 
(Çakır, 2000). These visits allowed normally home-bound pious women to enter into social life and become politicized. 
Despite women’s active role in boosting party’s popularity and electoral victory, in party administration they had very 
limited or no role, their presence was mainly symbolic. The successor of RP, the Fazilet Partisi (FP) tried to break the 
anti-women reputation and image of the party by adding women to the Central Decision Women Board. However, 
the women who were recruited in the party were again not the women who worked for the party out in the field but 
upper-class women who were educated in secular and Western schools, such as Nazli Ilicak and Oya Akgonenç (Narlı, 
2003). These women’s Western outlook, western dress sense did not truly represented the pious headscarved women. 
The presence of these women reproduced rather than changed the symbolic presence of women in the party (Amini et 
al., 2018). 
These circumstances established the second turning point of Islamic feminism in Turkey. Pious women who worked 
for the Islamic cause and who entered the political arena for an Islamist party in the hopes that their voice would be 
heard, excluded or marginalized them. The politicized, Islamist women of the cause questioned the gender equality, 
their male counterparts and the patriarchal characteristics of the religion and the party (Keskin-Kozat, 2003). The cause 
allowed them to move out of their homes, allowed them to have a life outside the patriarchal home , allowed them to 
socialize and work and pious women who saw that they can have a life for themselves did not want to lose that.   Sibel 
Eraslan, at the time head of the Istanbul Women’s section of RP had helped mobilize huge numbers in successful 
support of the Party, became disaffected when women were subsequently shunted aside (Göle, 1996).  In an interview 
with Badran, Eraslan argued that the shallow promises of the Islamist men caused her politicization as a feminist and 
led to her eventual creation, with other Islamist women, of a legal office for women’s human rights (Badran, 2005). 
Islamist women also have tried to show the hypocrisy of Islamist men when these men were using computers at work, 
they criticized the use of washing machines at home, in addition to that  women tried to show that Islamist men 
used religious marriage ceremonies to legitimize keeping mistresses in their lives (Çakır, 2000). These disappointments 
aligned Islamic feminists with the secular feminists on the grounds of shared challenges of suppression, exclusion and/or 
marginalization by patriarchal state structure particularly when, even the governing party is Islamically oriented. 
THE SECOND (TRANSITIONAL) PHASE: 2000-2013
The 2000s is marked by the Islamist feminist women’s active contribution to patriarchy. Their contribution came in two 
forms. The first form was through unpredicted silence of feminists of the first era in response to their marginalization 
from the party politics particularly in decision making processes. In an interview with Ruşen Çakır, Sibel Eraslan calls 
this silence as “erudite silence” (hikmetli sessizlik), she argues that despite their marginalization in the Islamist cause, 
pious women did not wish to lose the limited freedoms that were gained through the party (Refah Partisi) and also 
through the religionization of the politics (Çakır, 2000). Second form was through the AKP co-optation of these 
feminists into important positions in the party or pro-government organizations, institutions or businesses. 
The two forms are in line with what Deniz Kandiyoti coined as “patriarchal bargain”. In 1988, Deniz Kandiyoti 
introduced the term “the patriarchal bargain” to explain ways in which women in patriarchal societies, through varied 
Didem Aydindag
R
E
LI
G
A
C
IO
N
.  
VO
L 
4 
N
º 
18
, A
go
st
o 
 2
01
9,
 p
p.
 1
40
-1
48
144
Su
r-
Su
r
opportunities, achieve some sort of security and power but also shape women’s gendered subjectivity and determine the 
gender ideology (Kandiyoti, 1988). With the rise of the AKP many of the Islamist women found a place in the political 
organization and its civil branches. The integration of these pious women to party in a way muted the feminist discourse. 
To put in other words, political empowerment of these women created a new patriarch through the AKP government 
(Özcan, 2018). 
The AKP came to power in 2002, one year after the party’s establishment. With the break from Necmettin Erbakan’s 
National Outlook movement, the AKP identified itself as a ‘conservative democratic’ party rather than an ‘Islamist’ 
party, which strongly emphasized good ties with the West, universal values of democracy, human rights and plurality. 
Prior to the 2002 elections, the AKP highlighted three objectives. Firstly, because of the increased demand for better 
representation of ethnic and religious groups and better human rights standards, consolidated democracy was promoted. 
Secondly, because of the heavy burden of the 2001 economic crisis, strong emphasis was given to economic welfare. 
Thirdly, Turkey’s membership of the EU was promoted.  The AKP distanced itself from the anti-Western discourse of 
the previous Islamist parties through a dedication to human rights, democracy and secularism. The Party particularly 
highlighted women’s rights through improvement of gender equality.   In its first two terms in office between 2002 to 
2011), in line with Turkey’s EU accession polices, the party adopted the notion of gender equality in the Constitution 
(2004 and 2010), the Labor Code (2003), the Penal Code (in 2004), and by establishing an Equal Opportunity 
Commission in the Parliament in 2009 (Marshall, 2013). 
The problem is that, the AKP’s improvement of women’s condition stem not from internalizing equality of men and 
women, rather it stems from its “conservative democrat” identity in which protection of family and tradition (both 
patriarchal structures) gains utmost importance. From the second term in the office, particularly then-PM Erdoğan’s 
rhetoric and AKP government’s actions reflected the Party’s main mindset regarding women. In 2010 Erdoğan said 
that he does not believe in gender equality, in the same meeting with women delegates of NGO’s he also refused to 
have gender quota for elections (Vatan, 2010). In 2011, the Ministry for Women and the Family was replaced with 
Ministry of Family and Social Policy.  Despite secular women’s organizations protests the PM Erdoğan said, “we are a 
conservative democrat party, for us family is important” (Belge, 2011). During that time, Sibel Eraslan’s articles in star 
focused on Mecca and Ergenekon organizations, without a reference to any of the party policies regarding women. 
Similar silence can be seen in Cihan Aktaş and Nihal Bengisu Karaca. In 2015, the Constitutional Court decriminalized 
religious marriage unaccompanied by civil marriage, abolishing a legal measure that was adopted in 1936 in order to 
protect the rights that women gained through civil marriage (Kuyucu, 2016). In 2010 prime ministerial circular, issued 
to increase women’s employment and ensure equal opportunities, was revised. In the new draft of the circular the word 
“equality” was omitted, together with the previously adopted measures of equal pay for equal work, inspection of the 
establishment of crèches and daycare centers to support women’s employment, and inclusion of women’s organizations 
in decision-making processes regarding gender equality at work. None of the former Islamist feminist refer to these 
derogations of women’s conditions despite public protests against them. In 2016 the Minister of Family and Social 
Policy, Sema Ramazanoğlu, an Islamist woman, regarding the rapes of 45 kids by Ensar Foundation which has strong 
connections with the AKP said “It was a one time event, nothing happens from a one-time event”.  Regarding these, 
Acar points out that it becomes a lot more difficult for Islamic women’s movements to sever ties with the government 
and question it’s position because the governing party is conservative (Acar, 2014).  Zehra Yılmaz also pointed out that, 
the women’s increasing visibility in the public space does not directly provide equal conditions for women and men; 
on the contrary, the women’s bargain with patriarchy discourages the women rights defenders’ arguments/claims and 
also marginalizes them in the Islamist movement (Yılmaz, 2013). Korteweg and Yurdakul also points out conservative 
women’s organization could only indirectly support pious women who call for better representation of headscarved 
women since they don’t want to harm AKP members of the organization (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2016). This shows a 
disengagement between the AKP co-opted Islamist women, Islamic women’s organizations with close connections with 
the AKP and Islamic feminists.  
During this phase the academic discourse is also started to put emphasis more on similarities between the Islamic and 
secular feminism and less on its binary opposition. Main common ground being the patriarchal reading of Islam. Tuksal 
pointed out to the necessity of a new reading of hadiths. She argued that the existing patriarchal structure in the hadiths 
makes women a lower and secondary position than men (Tuksal, 2012).  The focus of these articles on commodification 
of female body, exploitation by politics and media, violence against women close the gap between Islamic and secular 
feminisms. For example, at the time Gül Aldıkaçtı Marshall focused on a comparison of secular feminist and Islamic 
women’s approaches to headscarf issue (Marshall, 2005) and their compatibility (Marshall, 2008), Margot Badran in 
a similar line compared Islamic and secular feminists in the Middle East (Badran, 2005). Another group focused on 
the AKP policies and their impact on women, among them Berna Turan compares the secular activism with pious 
nonresistance (Turam, 2008). Contrarily the writings of the first era Islamist feminist continued on focusing on the 
headscarf case and suppression of headscarved women in the pre-AKP period (Aktaş, 2006). 
One of the more prominent and interesting approach came from Nilüfer Göle in her “İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine: 
Melez Desenler” (Hybrid Designs) book. In the book she discusses the creation of mixed patterns by Muslims with 
modernity and secularism. The young Muslims interpret Islamic culture based on modernity and try to “open the 
door of a new human, time and civilization by reminding mysticism instead of actuality that captures modern man, 
preserving privacy against exhibitionism, giving priority to self rather than individual defined by desires and passions, 
increasing worldliness with transcendence, making hearts talk instead of mind” (Göle, 2002). She argues that both sides, 
the secular and Islamic sides start to hybridize and the difference between them decreases. This approach is important 
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particularly in the third phase where it can be seen that the Islamic feminism becomes more secular in their discourse 
and expectations. The boundary between the Islamic and secular feminists start to disappear. 
THE THIRD PHASE: SOCIAL MEDIA ISLAMIC FEMINISM 
This phase can be distinguishable by both pious women’s concentration less on the Islamic cause and more on individual 
and female selves, in that respect this phase is the beginning of the real Islamic feminism. By focusing of individual and 
female selves the third phase also sees Islamic feminism becoming more secular.  Secondly the phase is characterized 
by a generational shift in pious women. Social media feminism gained more prominence where instead of joining 
to a political party or a party’s women’s branch, women voice their concerns through blogging and/or social media 
communities. These social platforms allow Islamic feminists from varying backgrounds without a traditional power 
to be heard and allow both online and offline mobilization and recruitment through creating networks and increased 
online interaction. In these platforms feminists not only discuss their everyday struggle with patriarchy, but also focus on 
normally restricted issues such as abortion, female sexuality and criticisms of governments’ family and women-oriented 
discourse and policies. The relatively good privacy these social media establishments provide, allow women to more freely 
discuss issues where otherwise they would be unable or unwilling to.     
The Gezi Park protests were also important in the third phase in symbolizing the transformation of Islamic feminism. If 
social media is the method of feminists in voicing their concerns then Gezi Park protests set the agenda of the concerns. 
The protests began May 29, 2013 in Gezi Park located in Istanbul Taksim Square.  Taksim square and Gezi Park were 
symbols of secularism and progress the AKP’s attempt at building a mosque in the square and Erdoğan’s persistence 
in demolishing the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM), the secular symbol of Westernization through ballet and other 
performances became the concrete examples of cultural transformation of Erdoğan from conservative democracy to a 
forced Islamist identity. The protests which started as a peaceful environmental demonstration against the confiscation 
of a historical park for the building of a shopping mall, faced with denial of the right to peaceful assembly and un-
proportional police attacks. From the very beginning the Gezi protests were not solely a crisis at the environmental 
sector. The protests were against the AKP’s, particularly Erdoğan’s patriarchal rhetoric such as “C-section made our 
people infertile, they (secular parties) tried to decrease our population” (CNN Turk, 2013),  “women shall bore 3 or 
more kids” (BIA Haber Merkezi, 2014),  and especially comparing abortion to Uludere massacres, “every abortion is 
an Uludere” (NTV, 2012). Uludere massacre was an airstrike by Turkish military on December 28, 2010 which was 
thought to be against the PKK terrorists entering to Turkey from Iraqi border, which turned out to be 34 civilian Kurdish 
citizens smuggling goods from Iraq. 
The major issue of violence against women particularly domestic violence, did not found much coverage by the AKP 
unlike the importance of abortion. Gezi Park protests were the largest mass protest in a decade. In that respect an alliance 
between pious Muslim women and secular feminists were demonstrated at Gezi in their joined chant: “Take your hands 
off my body, my identity, my veil” (Tekay & Ustun, 2013). Following the news that a woman wearing a headscarf was 
harassed in Kabataş (which later proved to be false news), women’s groups came together on June 7 and walked from 
Kabataş to Gezi Park; They showed their solidarity with slogans such as Resist not with blasphemy but stubbornly ”, 
“We want nights, streets, squares and mosques”. On June 8, feminist groups organized a “profanity workshop where they 
shared non-sexist alternative profanity with their participants”. On June 13, the then governor of Istanbul Hüseyin Avni 
Mutlu and Prime Minister Erdoğan made a statement saying “Take your children away from Gezi” and the women who 
made up the human chain carried a banner with the words “Dear police mothers, get your children out of the park.” 
With this action, the women who brought a different perspective to the role of motherhood assigned to them by the 
state authorities, underlined that they were a part of the resistance. Among the first phase Islamist feminists only Hidayet 
Şevkatli Tuksal argued that AKP attempts to politically divide covered and uncovered women or to “instrumentalize” the 
experiences of women for their own political gain (Tuksal H. S., 2014). Sibel Eraslan on the other hand, argued that the 
protests were against headscarved women and against Tayyip Erdoğan, she later focused on victimization of headscarved 
women in secular system without referencing to protests underlying cause being AKP policies which suppress women in 
general (Eraslan, 2013).  Similarly Nihal Bengisu Karaca, journalist at HaberTurk, a pro-government daily, focused on 
victimization of Erdogan in Gezi protests (Karaca, 2013). 
What is seen in this phase is that as old Islamist feminists started gaining important positions in the party and working for 
pro-government newspapers, they estranged and kept their distance from gender-based debates and also from criticizing 
the government. This created the third turning point in Islamic feminism in which they distanced themselves from the 
Islamist feminists in their modality and primary challenges. One of the prominent groups in the protests, the Anti-
Capitalist Muslims, argued that “men and women are equal, Adam and Eve was equal” (Hürriyet Gündem, 2013).  They 
argued that “the essence of Islam is based on universal values such as justice, equality, love and compassion. The Holy 
Quran says, ‘There is no compulsion in religion’. Religion here means worldview and lifestyle. No one can be forced to 
believe in a worldview. When Islam comes, it is wrong for women to have their heads covered and forced” (Hürriyet 
Gündem, 2013). The Gezi protests showed that firstly, pious people especially women, ask for social and liberal Islam 
not political and restrictive Islam where there is no place for progression. Secondly, their criticism mainly was not against 
the secular structure anymore, it was against the patriarchy.
Reçel blog is one of the earliest examples of these post-Gezi phase Islamic feminists of social media.  It is a social platform 
created by the volunteers of Muslims Initiative Against Violence Against Women. The six founders of the blog are 
pious women aged in their early 30s and educated in various universities.  One of the founding members of Reçel blog, 
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Rümeysa Camdereli, criticize the patriarchy over then deputy PM, Bülent Arınç’s argument that “women shall not 
laugh loudly in public”. She wrote “‘Uncle Bülents, ‘uncle Tayyips, don’t want the state of mind that I’m getting away 
from with one laugh, to go away, because the other kind is dangerous to every kind of power. They want “headscarved 
sisters” who ask those “uncles” everything about their own life, who cannot decide about anything related to their own 
life.  We’re bored, they’re not bored!” (Camdereli, 2014). Aside from criticizing the conservative, Islamist government’s 
patriarchal suppression, what is new in Reçel blog is the discussions over female sexuality, virginity and female sexual 
satisfaction. In 2018, the guest writer Silahsız Avrat explained her own first experience which was out of wedlock along 
with the inability or unwillingness of the pious married women in her family and surrounding to explain her what 
she may expect or experience. The responses to her writing were mixed. Some of the respondents explained their own 
fathers’ or partners reaction to virginity, others criticized the author, arguing just because the men act immorally, the 
women should not act similarly. None of the commentators discussed whether or not such a discussion was in line with 
Islamic religion, whether or not it is a sin, or whether it is appropriate to discuss in a public platform. This alone shows 
the changing attitudes of Islamic feminists but also pious women (Recel Blog, 2018). In another article the unwanted 
pregnancies and pious women’s hopes, dreams outside of the marriage and childbearing were discussed and most of the 
commentators were supporting the writer for encouraging women to follow their dreams.
A more recent organization established in October 2018 called Havle. Havle is the first openly feminist Muslim women 
organization in Turkey.  Their main objective is to increase the inclusion of Muslim women in the feminist movement. 
They argue that this inclusion is possible by making the differences visible. This will take place in two dimensions: First, 
addressing specific problems, such as discriminatory expressions and approaches to Muslim women’s choice to cover / 
not cover their heads, and the problems women experience in mosques. Second dimension is related to all women in 
Turkey; the forced marriages and marriages at a very young age. These problems are fed by supposedly Islamic grounds 
and Havle women try to show that it is patriarchal suppression not Islamic duty (Meryem, 2019). 
The shift can also be detected in the academic discussions where the second phase focused on Islamic feminism’s 
compatibility with secular feminism, the more recent articles are focusing on transformation of feminism in the post-
Gezi era (Dorroll, 2016), criticizing patriarchy without a separation of Islamic and secular feminisms (Dönmez & 
Özmen, 2013), Islam and feminism’s mutual grounds (Arat, 2016), and mostly on gender politics of the AKP (Özcan, 
2018; Yaraş, 2019; Koyuncu & Özman, 2018; Ayata & Doğangün, 2017).  Furthermore, in the second phase there 
wasn’t a common ground or even discussion on issues such as sexual freedom, abortion and birth control. Despite the 
beginning of discussions about compatibility and similarity between Islamic and secular feminisms, these issues were 
considered somewhat taboo.  As seen in the third phase however, the Islamic feminists started to debate on these issues 
on public platforms and raise their voices on discussions of motherhood, sexuality, womanhood and their efforts to own 
the final decisions regarding their own body.  
Unlike the earlier phases of Islamic feminisms this third generation of Islamic feminists do not shy away from the term 
feminism, particularly the post Gezi  feminists identify themselves as Islamic feminists such as the Reçel blog platform. 
The change is also seen not just in the new feminist groups, but also in the formerly existing groups who used to shy away 
from being labeled as feminists too, such as Başkent Kadın Platformu (Öztürk, 2018). This symbolizes the next stage 
in the Islamic feminism whereby Islamic and secular feminists come together and break down boundaries and binaries. 
This way, the two feminisms can produce Islam’s gender revolution (Badran, 2005).  
This has shown that civil Islamism with the back up of social platforms has opened a new frontier for Islamic feminist 
women through encouraging solidarity and emphasizing shared experiences. In a study at the Qatar Computing 
Research Institute (Magno & Weber, 2014), researchers found that in countries with large gender inequities in 
offline life, women were more likely to have significant online presences.  This seems to also prove Margot Badran’s 
foresight as Islamic feminism would be becoming more secular in the future.  She argued that it would become part of a 
complex weave of multiple voices clamoring for gender justice and gender equality. She called this new secular feminism 
whereby a secular feminism re-invigorated by a more robust discourse of gender equality in religious language—which 
celebrates inclusivity (Badran, 2010). 
CONCLUSION
What is found out in the research is that the Islamic feminism in Turkey is neither monolithic nor static.  The article 
argued that from the 1980s onward there are three phases of Islamic feminism in which the Islamic feminism evolved 
and changed in its discourse, methods and concerns. It also differs from the emergence of Islamic feminism in the rest of 
the Muslim world. One particular reason for this is, unlike the other countries Turkey is a secular country and the state 
sponsored feminism at the time marginalized the pious, headscarved women. Despite this similar to other countries, 
the emergence of Islamic feminism owes much of its existence to interaction with the secular world, whether living in a 
secular state or being educated in secular countries. 
The first phase in Turkey is coined as Islamist feminism due to it’s reaction to secularism and Western style modernization 
of Turkey. In Turkey the main aim of emergency of Islamic feminism was not questioning the patriarchal or oppressive 
structure of Islam or political Islam, the primary aim was to integrate Islam into social and political sphere. Islamic 
feminism’s entrance into literature and academic debates also coincide with the political atmosphere of the era where 
both Islamist parties and the Islamist women entered into Turkish social and political sphere as significant actors.
The second phase is the transitional phase emerging in early 2000s to 2013. Although the Islamist feminists of the 
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first era continue to dominate the political and social sphere, criticisms emerged regarding their contribution to AKP 
patriarchy. A disengagement is observed between the AKP co-opted Islamist women, Islamic women’s organizations with 
close connections with the AKP and Islamic feminists.  The first era’s pious active women gained important positions in 
the party and pro-AKP organizations, in return remained silent on women’s suppression or commodification for political 
causes. 
The current phase saw the concretization of Islamic feminism in the post Gezi resistance. Feminists of this era focus 
on individual and female selves. By focusing of individual and female selves the third phase also sees Islamic feminism 
becoming more secular.  Secondly the phase is characterized by a generational shift in pious women. Young pious 
women in their late 20s and 30s become the locomotive behind the social media feminism.  Civil Islamism gained more 
prominence in this phase and secular and Islamic feminists have much more common ground than the previous eras 
focusing on not just secular but Islamist governments patriarchal suppression of women.
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